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I. THE SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE1
“Aviation is proof that given the will, we have the capacity to
achieve the impossible.”2
In today’s world, “it is imperative . . . [for] an efficient [and
secure] . . . flow of goods and passengers”3 that we find the “will”
to develop, implement, and maintain reasonable and resilient
cybersecurity in aviation. Given the scope of the aviation indus-
* Mr. Simmons is a former General Counsel of the Texas Secretary of State
and of Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART) (retired after twenty-four years of
service, last five years as DART’s General Counsel). Mr. Simmons currently serves
as a Board Member and General Counsel for numerous non-profit corporations,
including serving as General Counsel for the InfraGard National Members
Alliance—a national alliance between the FBI and the private sector to help
improve the security, preparedness, and resiliency of America’s critical
infrastructure. Mr. Simmons was the 2009 recipient of the Magna Stella Award
for excellence in leadership and management for a non-profit or government
agency from the Texas General Counsel Forum. Mr. Simmons is a 1984 graduate
of the University of Texas at Austin School of Law. He received his Bachelor of
Science in Government from Lamar University, where he completed a four-year
program in two and a half years with High Honors.  In 2017, he received the
Lamar University Distinguished Alumnus Award.
1 Caveat: The information contained in this article is provided for educational
and informational purposes only, and the statements contained herein are solely
the opinions of Hyattye O. Simmons or cited authorities. No copyright is claimed
to original U.S. government works or original works by other authors.
2 This quote has been attributed to Edward (Eddie) Vernon Rickenbacker
(October 8, 1890—July 23, 1973) https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/519937-
aviation-is-proof-that-given-the-will-we-have-the [https://perma.cc/7X4A-WD67].
Captain Rickenbacker was an American World War I “ace” fighter pilot and a
World War I Medal of Honor recipient. See generally Edward Rickenbacker, THE AER-
ODROME, http://www.theaerodrome.com/aces/usa/rickenbacker.php [https://
perma.cc/3RR8-HVZQ]; see also Medal of Honor Recipients, U.S. ARMY CENTER OF
MILITARY HISTORY, http://www.history.army.mil/moh/worldwari.html#RICKEN
BACKER [https://perma.cc/3XKP-C5NN].
3 MARIA G. BURNS, LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY: A STRATEGIC,
TACTICAL, AND OPERATIONAL GUIDE TO RESILIENCE xxv (2016).
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try in the United States,4 this article will analyze the nature of
cybersecurity in three main areas: major cybersecurity issues, the
importance of these issues, and recommended solutions.
II. MAJOR CYBERSECURITY ISSUES5
A. AVIATION-SPECIFIC CYBERSECURITY ISSUES: THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE’S6 CRITICAL REVIEWS OF
THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION’S CYBERSECURITY
MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), “an agency of the
Department of Transportation, is primarily responsible for the
advancement, safety, and regulation of civil aviation, as well as
overseeing the development of the [nation’s] air traffic control
system,” known as the National Airspace System (NAS).7 “Over
4 In 2014, air carriers in the United States performed almost 9 million aircraft
departures, transported over 700 million “revenue passengers,” and carried over
12 million “revenue tons” of freight and mail. See U.S. Dep’t of Transp., National
Transportation Statistics, 68 (2015), https://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/
rita.dot.gov.bts/files/NTS_Entire_15Q4_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8465-WN9U].
During the same year, general aviation, which is defined as “all aviation other
than military and scheduled commercial airlines,” accounted for “$219 billion in
total economic output in the United States.” See Gen. Aviation Mfrs. Ass’n, General
Aviation Statistical Databook & 2015 Industry Outlook 1 (2014), https://gama.aero/
wp-content/uploads/GAMA_2014_Databook_LRes-LowRes.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3F62-MTX7] . As an industry, “[b]ased on data collected during the
last census in 2012, aviation . . . contributed $1.5 trillion in total [United States]
economic activity . . . .” Matthew Lew et al., Please Fasten Your Seat Belts: Managing
Digital Risk to Support Aviation Innovation, DELOITTE, at 1, (Apr. 2015), https://
www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/consumer-business/
us-cb-aviation-cyber-risk-report-04222015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZL5-W9UL].
5 Information and analysis contained in this section of the article is derived
from non-classified, non-confidential, publicly available, and reliable sources.
6 “The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent,
nonpartisan agency that works for Congress. Often called the ‘congressional
watchdog,’ GAO investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer
dollars. The head of GAO, the Comptroller General of the United States, is
appointed to a 15-year term by the President from a slate of candidates Congress
proposes.” About GAO, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.gao.gov/
about/ [https://perma.cc/7HRL-KH8Y].
7 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-221, INFORMATION SECURITY:
FAA NEEDS TO ADDRESS WEAKNESSES IN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS 3 (2015)
[hereinafter GAO-15-221]. This system “includes more than 19,000 airports,
nearly 600 air traffic control facilities, and approximately 65,000 other facilities,
including radar . . . [and] ground-based navigation aids.” Id. “The Department of
Transportation’s (DOT) operations rely on 463 information technology (IT) sys-
tems, nearly two-thirds of which belong to . . . FAA . . . . These systems represent
an annual investment of approximately $3 billion—one of the largest IT invest-
ments among Federal civilian agencies. Moreover, the Department’s financial IT
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46,000 FAA personnel and approximately 608,000 pilots operate
about 228,000 aircraft within the NAS, including up to 2,850
flights at any given moment.”8 As aircraft moves across the NAS,
more than 500 air traffic control towers supervise flights, assisted
by 160 Terminal Radar Approach Control facilities and twenty-
two Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC).9 The figure be-
low provides a summary of air traffic control in the United
States10:
Figure 1
systems are used to award, disburse, and manage approximately $117 billion in
Federal funds annually.” OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REP.
FI-2016-001, FISMA 2015: DOT HAS MAJOR SUCCESS IN PIV IMPLEMENTATION, BUT
PROBLEMS PERSIST IN OTHER CYBERSECURITY AREAS 2 (2015) [hereinafter REP. FI-
2016-001].
8 GAO-15-221, supra note 7, at 3.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 5 fig.1.
774 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
1. GAO’s January 2015 Report on FAA’s Information Security11
U.S. Congress members requested that the GAO12 “review
FAA’s information security program.”13 The review’s purpose
“was to evaluate the extent to which FAA had effectively imple-
mented information security controls to protect its air traffic
control systems.”14 The GAO concluded that, although the “FAA
took many steps to address . . . risks” in a large, complex, inter-
connected system like the NAS,15 “weaknesses remain that chal-
lenge [ ] FAA in fulfilling its mission of ensuring the safety and
efficiency of the nation’s airspace operations.”16 Specifically, the
GAO made the following cybersecurity-related findings:
• “Inadequately protected systems may be vulnerable to insider
threats as well as the risk of intrusion by individuals or groups
with malicious intent who could use their illegitimate access
to obtain sensitive information, disrupt operations, or launch
attacks against other computer systems and networks.”17
• The FAA’s increased use of Internet Protocol technologies to
communicate over interconnected computer networks
“comes [with] increased risk: integrating critical infrastruc-
ture systems with information technology networks provides
significantly less isolation from the outside world than prede-
cessor systems, creating a greater need to secure these systems
from remote, external threats.”18
• “FAA Did Not Consistently Control Access to NAS Systems.”19
11 Id. at 3.
12 The Honorable John Thune, Chairman; The Honorable Bill Nelson, Rank-
ing Member, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United
States Senate; The Honorable Bill Shuster, Chairman; The Honorable Peter
DeFazio, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
United States House of Representatives; The Honorable Frank A. LoBiondo,
Chairman; The Honorable Rick Larsen, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Avi-
ation Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of
Representatives; and The Honorable John Katko, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security Committee on Homeland Security, United States House
of Representatives. Id. at 35.
13 GAO-15-221, supra note 7, at GAO Highlights, i. “Maintaining an effective in-
formation security program—one that quickly identifies and addresses vulnera-
bilities—is critical to ensuring continuity of operations and thwarting individuals
who attempt to gain unauthorized access to systems and information.” REP. FI-
2016-001, supra note 7, at 2.
14 GAO-15-221, supra note 7, at GAO Highlights, i.
15 See id. at 3.
16 Id. at 30.
17 Id. at 7.
18 Id. at 8.
19 Id. at 13.
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• “Although Control Mechanisms Were Put in Place, FAA Did
Not Always Adequately Protect the Boundary of NAS
Systems.”20
• “FAA Did Not Consistently Implement Controls for Identify-
ing and Authenticating Users of NAS Systems.”21
• “FAA Did Not Always Ensure Users Were Properly Authorized
to Access NAS Systems.”22
• “Sensitive Data Were Not Always Sufficiently Encrypted.”23
• “Changes to Network Systems and Software Were Not Always
Properly Controlled.”24
• “FAA Did Not Always Properly Control Changes to Network
Devices or Ensure Key Systems Were Fully Patched.”25
• “FAA Did Not Fully Implement Its Information Security
Program.”26
• “Identified Security Weaknesses Were Not Always Addressed
in a Timely Fashion.”27
• “NAS Incident Detection and Response Activities Were
Limited.”28
• “Contingency Plans Were Not Always Complete or Adequately
Tested.”29
• “Inadequate Agency-Wide Information Security Risk Manage-
ment Processes Contribute to Weaknesses in Security Con-
trols and Security Management.”30
In its last conclusion, the GAO stated:
Until FAA establishes stronger agency-wide information security
risk management processes, fully develops its NAS information
security program, and ensures that remedial actions are ad-
dressed in a timely manner, the weaknesses that we identified are
likely to continue, placing the safe and uninterrupted operation
of the nation’s air traffic control system at increased and unnec-
essary risk.31
In a written response to the GAO’s report, the FAA concurred
with the GAO’s recommendations for improving the NAS infor-
20 Id. at 14.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 15.
23 Id. at 16.
24 Id. at 17.
25 Id. at 18.
26 Id. at 19.
27 Id. at 23.
28 Id. at 24.
29 Id. at 25.
30 Id. at 27.
31 Id. at 31.
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mation security.32 The Department of Transportation “also
stated that FAA recognizes the need to secure the NAS environ-
ment as part of the nation’s critical infrastructure, and that FAA
has taken several steps to improve NAS information security.”33
2. GAO’s April 2015 Report on FAA’s Transition to “NextGen”34
“NextGen is a modernization effort begun in 2004 by FAA to
transform the nation’s ground-based [Air Traffic Control] sys-
tem into a system that uses satellite-based navigation and other
advanced technology . . . [which] will use an Internet Protocol
(IP) based network to communicate.”35 The figures below show
the “different parts of the NAS, the flow of information among
them, and their transition to an IP-based network”36:
Figure 2
32 Id. at 33, 39–40. Please note that besides the GAO’s recommendations for
improving the FAA’s NAS information security, the GAO also made an additional
168 recommendations “in a separate report with limited distribution.” Id. at
31–32.
33 Id. at 33.
34 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-370, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL:
FAA NEEDS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO ADDRESS CYBERSECURITY AS
AGENCY TRANSITIONS TO NEXTGEN (2015) [hereinafter GAO-15-370].
35 Id. at 4.
36 Id. at 4–5.
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Figure 3
As shown by the figure below, the Surveillance and Broadcast
Services Subsystem (SBSS), the Collaborative Air Traffic Man-
agement (CATM), and the Common Support Services Weather
(CSS-Wx) comprise three of the six NextGen foundational
programs37:
Figure 4
Data Communications (Data Comm), the NAS Voice Switch
(NVS), and the System Wide Information Management
(SWIM), as shown below, comprise the remaining three
NextGen foundational programs38:
37 Id. at 6–7.
38 Id.
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Figure 5
As with the January 2015 GAO review of the FAA, U.S. Con-
gress members requested that the GAO39 perform a review of
the FAA, but this time the focus was on the FAA’s cybersecurity
efforts.40 During the course of its review, the GAO found three
significant cybersecurity challenges facing the FAA: “protecting
[the] air traffic control [ ] information system, [ ]securing air-
craft avionics used to operate and guide aircraft, and [ ]clarify-
ing cybersecurity roles and responsibilities among multiple FAA
offices.”41 With regard to the first cybersecurity challenge, pro-
tecting the air traffic control information system, the GAO made
the following finding:
New networking technologies connecting FAA’s ATC [Air Traffic
Control] information systems expose these systems to new cyber-
security risks, potentially increasing opportunities for systems to
be compromised and damaged. Such damage could stem both
from attackers seeking to gain access to and move among infor-
mation systems, and from trusted users of the systems, such as
controllers or pilots, who might inadvertently cause harm. FAA’s
39 The Honorable John Thune, Chairman; The Honorable Bill Nelson, Rank-
ing Member, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United
States Senate; The Honorable Bill Shuster, Chairman; The Honorable Peter
DeFazio, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
United States House of Representatives; The Honorable Frank A. LoBiondo,
Chairman; The Honorable Rick Larsen, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Avi-
ation Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of
Representatives; and The Honorable John Katko, United States House of Repre-
sentatives. Id. at 44.
40 Id. at GAO Highlights, i.
41 Id. at 11.
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ATC-related information systems are currently a mixture of old,
legacy systems and new, IP-networked systems. FAA’s legacy sys-
tems consist mainly of decades-old, point-to-point, hardwired in-
formation systems, such as controller voice-switching systems,
that share information only within their limited, wired configura-
tion. In contrast, FAA plans for NextGen call for the new infor-
mation systems to be networked together with IP technology into
an overarching system of interoperating subsystems . . . . [I]f one
system connected to an IP network is compromised, damage can
potentially spread to other systems on the network, continually
expanding the parts of the system at risk . . . . We reported in
January 2015 [in GAO 15-221] that FAA has taken steps to pro-
tect its ATC systems from cyber-based threats. However, we stated
that significant security-control weaknesses remain that threaten
the agency’s ability to ensure the safe and uninterrupted opera-
tion of the national airspace system. We made numerous recom-
mendations to address these weaknesses, and FAA has concurred
with these recommendations.42
IP connectivity was also at the center of the threat for the second
cybersecurity challenge, securing aircraft avionics:
[M]odern communications technologies, including IP connectiv-
ity, are increasingly used in aircraft systems, creating the possibil-
ity that unauthorized individuals might access and compromise
aircraft avionics systems. Aircraft information systems consist of
avionics systems used for flight and in-flight entertainment [see
figure [ ] below]. Historically, aircraft in flight and their avionics
systems used for flight guidance and control functioned as iso-
lated and self-contained units, which protected their avionics sys-
tems from remote attack. However, . . . IP networking may allow
an attacker to gain remote access to avionics systems and com-
promise them . . . .43
42 Id. at 12–13. The GAO further found that the FAA is “designing and de-
ploying an enterprise approach intended to strengthen the cybersecurity of its
information systems.” Id. at 14. Notwithstanding, the GAO found that the FAA
could enhance its cybersecurity by adopting and implementing a “holistic threat
model,” which “could help FAA be more proactive in dealing with the rise of
insider threats in federal agencies.” Id. at 15–16. In making this last statement,
the GAO referenced a 2014 FAA “malicious” incident:
The 2014 malicious insider attack on FAA’s Aurora, Illinois, en-
route facility, while not facilitated through cyber means, destroyed
ATC IP and point-to-point telecommunications lines, preventing
ATC electronic communications and the gathering and use of
flight data, such as radar data, to track aircraft, resulting in over
$350 million in financial losses to airlines.
Id. at 16 n.22.
43 Id. at 18. In response to this threat,
780 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
Figure 6
Lastly, with regard to clarifying cybersecurity roles and re-
sponsibilities, the GAO found that the FAA has taken steps to
(1) “align [ ] cybersecurity orders and policies, as well as IT in-
frastructure and governance, with the changing needs of the
FAA’s Office of Safety began developing a [more comprehensive]
airworthiness rule covering avionics cybersecurity in 2013 but deter-
mined more research was necessary before rulemaking could begin
and halted the process. In December 2014, FAA tasked its Aviation
Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) with submitting a report
within 14 months of the March 2015 kickoff meeting that provides
recommendations on rulemaking and policy, and guidance on best
practices for information security protection for aircraft, including
both certification of avionics software and hardware, and continued
airworthiness.
Id. at 21.
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NextGen cyber environment[,]” and (2) to “better coordinate
its cybersecurity efforts.”44
3. Epilogue to GAO’s Reviews of FAA: Improvements45 Have Been
Made, But More are Needed
The FAA has taken steps to better protect the NAS, including
NextGen, from cyberattacks. For example, as shown by the fig-
ure below, the six NextGen foundational programs are in the
process of being made more secure46:
44 Id. at 22. With regard to better coordination, the GAO noted that “FAA runs
exercises that simulate cyber-attacks and are designed to increase internal collab-
oration and help clarify roles during such events.” Id.
45 In the process of writing this article, this author contacted the FAA to obtain
its most current public response to the GAO’s findings and recommendations.
On January 5, 2016, Mark Allen, Chief of Staff, FAA NextGen (ANG), responded
to my request by referencing the FAA’s letter to GAO (dated Mar. 31, 2015)
starting on page 48 of GAO-15-370. Below are excerpts from this letter:
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recognizes that cyber-
based threats to federal information systems are becoming a more
significant risk and are rapidly evolving and increasingly difficult to
detect and defend against. We take this risk very seriously. We know
that the Agency must be vigilant against the disruption of critical
operations and infrastructure systems as more new internet-
connected technologies are introduced into the National Airspace
System (NAS). Accordingly, the FAA is committed to strengthening
our capabilities to defend against new and evolving threats with a
high degree of urgency . . . . It is also important to note that the
FAA had already initiated a comprehensive program to improve the
cybersecurity defenses of the NAS infrastructure, as well as other
FAA mission-critical systems . . . . Recognizing the need to ensure
an Agency-wide view and oversight of cyber-risk, the FAA
established an Executive Cybersecurity Steering Committee (CSC)
in November 2013 . . . . CSC priorities include the identification
and correction of both existing and evolving vulnerabilities on all
internet protocol-based systems and the establishment of an
Agency-wide threat model for fiscal year 2016 . . . . The FAA
established a Cyber Test Facility at the William J. Hughes Technical
Center to enable thorough testing of cybersecurity capabilities to
fully understand the impact, if any, before introducing them into
our operational systems . . . . The FAA concurs with
recommendations l and 3 [contained in GAO-15-370] and will
implement the appropriate corrective actions by January 30, 2016.
The Agency believes it has complied with the intent of
recommendation 2.
Id. at 48–49.
46 Id. at 30 fig.2.
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Figure 7
Notwithstanding, there remains significant room for improve-
ment.47 Once accomplished, the end result of these improve-
47 This report contained the following recommendations for FAA
improvement:
To better ensure that cybersecurity threats to NextGen systems are
addressed, the Secretary of Transportation should instruct the FAA
Administrator to take the following three actions.
• As a first step to developing an agency-wide threat model, as-
sess the potential cost and timetable for developing such a
threat model and the resources required to maintain it.
• Incorporate the Office of Safety into FAA’s agency-wide ap-
proach by including it on the Cybersecurity Steering
Committee.
• Given the challenges FAA faces in meeting OMB’s guidance
to implement the latest security controls in NIST’s revised
guidelines within one year of issuance, develop a plan to fund
and implement the NIST revisions within OMB’s time frames.
Id. at 41. For more areas in which the FAA needs improvement, see GAO-15-221,
supra note 7, at 31–32; see also REP. FI-2016-001, supra note 7, at 10, 13, 15–16,
18–20, 24–28, 30–31, 38. In one of its findings, the GAO determined that the
FAA’s SBSS, one of NextGen’s foundational programs, did not “Sufficiently As-
sess Key Controls Prior to Deployment.” GAO-15-370, supra note 34, at 35. This
contributed to a system outage:
[I]n August 2010, an engineer made an error while implementing
a system change that caused the network to shut down, which pre-
vented surveillance data transmitted through the hub from reach-
ing FAA control centers. As a result, air traffic controllers could not
use SBSS surveillance data to help separate aircraft in the affected
locations for nearly 16 hours. A report produced by the SBSS con-
tractor after the outage identified that the outage had occurred be-
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ments will be a safer and more secure NAS and aviation industry
for this country.48
B. OTHER MAJOR CYBERSECURITY ISSUES
The aviation industry is also “exposed to more familiar cyber
risks” as a result of its dependence on technology.49 Boeing, one
of the world’s largest aerospace companies and a leading manu-
facturer of commercial jetliners, summarized the aviation indus-
try’s dependence on technology as follows:
Networks are embedded in our economies and our political and
social lives. These networks and information systems hold infor-
mation of immense value, and they control the machinery that
provides our critical services and impact our everyday lives from
banking to travel. While this interconnectedness creates im-
mense economic value, we now realize it has the potential of be-
ing a major source of risk to commerce and our nation.50
For example, “[e]-commerce is the aviation industry’s primary
sales platform. With the development of sophisticated online
sales channels and rewards programs, airlines have become in-
cause of shortcomings in the processes and controls for managing
and controlling changes to the system . . . . FAA officials stated the
outage has been thoroughly investigated to ensure that the SBSS
program and the contractor learned from the experience, and that
remedial actions were taken to strengthen the controls.
GAO-15-370, supra note 34, at 35–36.
48 While its reviews focused on the FAA, the GAO’s analysis and findings could
be utilized by other entities within the aviation industry to improve their cyber-
security. For example, adoption and implementation of a “holistic threat model”
could enhance any entity’s cybersecurity. See GAO-15-370, supra note 34, at 15.
The concept of applying a “holistic approach” to aviation cybersecurity is not
new: “While overcoming current cyber security concerns require technical exper-
tise, the aviation security community should address this new security landscape holistically
and aim for cyber resilience, rather than merely plugging gaps in the current
cyber security architecture deployed in the aviation systems.” Martin Siu et al.,
Aviation Cyber Security: A New Security Landscape, J. AVIATION MGMT., at 74 (2014)
(emphasis added) http://www.saa.com.sg/saaWeb2011/export/sites/saa/en/
Publication/downloads/AviationCyberSecurity_A_NewSecurityLandscape.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q7ZZ-F4SM]. The Journal of Aviation Management is an an-
nual publication by the Singapore Aviation Academy, the training arm of the
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore. About Us, SING. AVIATION ACAD., http://
www.saa.com.sg/saaWeb2011/export/sites/saa/en/About_Us/?__locale=en
[https://perma.cc/45RC-32KV].
49 Matthew Lew et al., supra note 4, at 3.
50 The Boeing Company, Developing a Framework to Improve Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. 1, 4 (Apr. 8, 2013) https://
www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/06/01/040813_boeing_
part2.pdf [https://perma.cc/SVR3-4PDV].
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creasingly reliant on Internet-based data exchange to transact
and promote their businesses.”51 This increased use of technol-
ogy in the aviation industry has been motivated “by the drive
towards achieving greater efficiency, reduction in the use of
manpower, and greater use of IT to reduce cost and increase
synergies between and amongst stakeholders.”52 While this “elec-
tronic connectivity” has immense economic value, as previously
noted, it also has major risks:
Loyalty program IDs and payment card information (PCI) are
used to link consumers to their reservations, and may be stored
and accessed by a range of other services, including executive
club memberships, seat upgrades, and baggage check-in services,
across a range of devices like in-airport kiosks, consumer
handheld devices and gate agent kiosks. A gate agent or auto-
mated kiosk can access a customer’s entire profile and itinerary
using one piece of personal identification information (PII). A
cyber breach involving a single identifier, or a rudimentary social
engineering attack . . . could threaten passenger safety, and ex-
pose airlines to new sources of potential liability.53
Accordingly, “cyber threats such as computer viruses and
more malicious deliberate attacks on [aviation] computer sys-
tems54 by hackers and other adversaries are not new occur-
rences.”55 As shown by the diagrams below, this type of
cybersecurity threat continues to grow56:
51 Matthew Lew et al., supra note 4, at 3.
52 Bernard Lim, Aviation Security: Emerging Threats from Cyber Security in Avia-




53 Matthew Lew et al., supra note 4, at 3.
54 TRANSP. RES. BD., Guidebook on Best Practices for Airport Cybersecurity, AIRPORT
COOP. RES. PROGRAM, Rep. 140, at 1 (2015), http://onlinepubs.trb.org/online
pubs/acrp/acrp_rpt_140.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP7Y-QJ3M].
The technology that may be affected is not limited to the desktop
computers, servers, and network devices that compose typical infor-
mation technology (IT) infrastructure. Flight information display
systems (FIDS), airfield lighting controls, heating and ventilation
systems, baggage handling systems, access control devices, and a
broad range of other mission-critical systems rely on digital technol-
ogy that may be vulnerable to attack. Since these systems are often
not regarded as computing devices, cybersecurity protective mea-
sures are often not applied.
55 Lim, supra note 52, at 83.
56 McAfee Threats Report: November 2015, MCAFEE 1, 49–53 (2015), http://
www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-quarterly-threats-nov-2015.pdf
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Figure 8
[https://perma.cc/JCN5-3ULH]. McAfee, one of the leading companies provid-
ing global digital security solutions (i.e., anti-malware, antispyware, and antivirus)
and now a standalone company, (see generally, A Brand New McAfee Commits to
Building a Safer Future, MCAFEE (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.mcafee.com/mx/
about/newsroom/press-releases/press-release.aspx?news_id=20170403006682
[https://perma.cc/Q85L-JSN6]), found that every “hour more than 7.4 million
attempts were made (via emails, browser searches, etc.) to entice our customers
into connecting to risky URLs[; every] hour more than 3.5 million infected files
were exposed to our customers’ networks[; and every] hour an additional 7.4
million potentially unwanted programs attempted installation or launch.” Id. at 3.
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Figure 9
Figure 10
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In addition to this trend,57 cybercriminals continue to develop
inventive methods of finding their victims,58 including the de-
ployment of new types of cyber threats:
[These new threats include a] new breed of fileless malware,
which evades detection by hiding in the Microsoft Windows regis-
try and deleting all traces of its infection from the file system . . . ,
poor coding practices for mobile app cloud security . . . [which
increased the risk of] exposure of user data in the cloud, [and
the] return of macro malware, primarily through sophisticated
spam [e-mail] campaigns and clever macros that remain hidden
even after they have downloaded their payloads.59
[Furthermore, cloud] computing will also provide tremendous
resources to [cybercriminals] in the form of computing and stor-
age capacity, plus the ability to appear and disappear at the click
of a mouse. Law enforcement organizations will find it challeng-
57 The amount of money that cybercriminals are collecting from these activi-
ties is staggering. For example, with regard to just one type of ransomware, “the
CryptoWall Version 3 ransomware family, . . . has generated in excess of $325
million in ransom payments . . . .” Id. Ransomware “is a type of malware that
prevents or limits users from accessing their [computer] system [or data] . . .
[until] its victims [pays money] through certain online payment methods.” Defini-
tions: Ransomware, TREND MICRO (2017), http://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/
security/definition/Ransomware [https://perma.cc/4H49-BLLA].
The word malware comes from the words “malicious software.” It is
an umbrella term for any piece of software, script or code designed
by its creators to perform specific routines or have specific behav-
iors that have undesirable results for the affected users of a com-
puter system or a network. These undesirable results include
anything from annoying popup ads or messages, disruption of nor-
mal computer operations, to the exposure of personal or confiden-
tial data. Malware encompasses computer viruses, Trojans, worms,
spyware, backdoors, and other malicious software.
Threat Encyclopedia: Malware, TREND MICRO (Oct. 9, 2012), http://
www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/malware [https:/
/perma.cc/M2XG-ASAK].
58 For example, in a “watering hole” cyber-attack, the cybercriminal researches
the “web habits” of a targeted group or organization. Once the cybercriminal has
identified a website that is frequently visited by the targeted group, the cyber-
criminal infects the website with malware: the goal being to infect the computer
(and computer systems of the organization) when a member of the targeted
group visits the “tainted” website. See Watering Hole Attacks, SYMANTEC (2012),
https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/pdfs/b-istr_18_water
ing_hole_edits.en-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX6B-BAR2]. During one “signifi-
cant watering hole attack, [the cybercriminals] took advantage [of a web site]
vulnerability . . . and coupled [malware] with a specific piece of software pro-
duced by [the] legitimate vendor.” Symantec, Internet Security Threat Report, 20
ISTR 1, 66 (2015), http://www.symantec.com/security_response/publications/
threatreport.jsp [https://perma.cc/K8FD-C93L].
59 McAfee Threats Report: November 2015, supra note 56, at 3.
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ing to shut down an entire cloud service provider for the behav-
ior of [a few] criminal clients, so it will be necessary to go after
other criminal resources, such as their Bitcoin wallets,60 to put
them out of business.61
Finally, “[w]ith the continued growth of the global civil avia-
tion industry, the increasing number of air [travelers], develop-
ment of new, larger and more modern airports as well as the
introduction of new and more sophisticated aircraft,”62 the avia-
tion industry will have to develop new methods of handling the
never ending increase of the “cyberattack surface.”63 As shown
by the figure below, “more users, more data, more devices, and
more clouds [are] creating a perfect security storm of threats
and vulnerabilities”64:
60 Correspondingly, to go after the “illegal wealth” obtained by cybercriminals,
on April 1, 2015, President Obama issued Executive Order 13694, titled Blocking
the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled
Activities:
I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America,
find that the increasing prevalence and severity of malicious cyber-
enabled activities originating from, or directed by persons located,
in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States constitute
an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, for-
eign policy, and economy of the United States. I hereby declare a
national emergency to deal with this threat.
Exec. Order No. 13694, 80 Fed. Reg.18,077 (Apr. 1, 2015) (“Blocking the Prop-
erty of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled
Activities”).
In accordance with this Executive Order, on December 31, 2015, the U.S. De-
partment of Treasury issued final regulations to govern its application and en-
forcement. See Cyber-Related Sanctions Regulations, 80 Fed. Reg. 81,752 (Dec.
31, 2015) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 578).
61 2016 Threats Predictions, MCAFEE, at 16 (2016), http://www.mcafee.com/us/
resources/reports/rp-threats-predictions-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QEM-
VV4D].
62 Lim, supra note 52, at 83.
63 2016 Threats Predictions, supra note 61, at 7–8.
64 Id. at 7. The “Growing Cyberattack Surface” figure, while its author, McAfee
Labs, does not explicitly state, is assumed to be demonstrating worldwide data
and usage growth. This figure also mentions two uncommon (to the average
technology user) units of digital information storage: “exabytes” and “zettabytes.”
One exabyte (EB) is equal to approximately 1 billion gigabytes (GB) of data, and
one zettabyte (ZB) is equal to approximately 1 trillion gigabytes. See Charles Ar-
thur, What’s a Zettabyte? By 2015, the Internet Will Know, Says Cisco, THE GUARDIAN
(June 29, 2011, 6:20 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/2011/
jun/29/zettabyte-data-internet-cisco [https://perma.cc/ZCT5-J8NL]. To put this
in perspective, one exabyte amounts to “36,000 years of HD-TV video” while one
zettabyte would be the equivalent of thirty-six million years of HD-TV video. Id.
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Figure 11
III. WHY SHOULD YOU CARE ABOUT CYBERSECURITY?
A. WE ARE FAMILY: PROTECTING PEOPLE, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND
GOODS
“The actors within the aviation ecosystem have a cohesive in-
terest [in] ensuring . . . cybersecurity[,]”65 the protection of “ef-
ficient [and secure] flow of goods and passengers[,]”66 and of
the aviation infrastructure67 in which they travel. No matter the
65 THE BOEING COMPANY, supra note 50, at 14.
66 BURNS, supra note 3, at xxv.
67 In addition to aircraft, the airports themselves require protection because
Airports are vital national resources. They serve a key role in trans-
portation of people and goods and in regional, national, and inter-
national commerce. They are where the nation’s aviation system
connects with other modes of transportation and where federal re-
sponsibility for managing and regulating air traffic operations inter-
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role (i.e., federal government, state government, local govern-
ment, manufacturer, airline, contractor, law firm, employee,
customer,68 attorney, etc.), if you participate in the “aviation
ecosystem,” then this is your responsibility.
B. AVOIDING THE “GREATEST ILLUSION”
“The greatest trick the Devil ever pulled was convincing the
world he didn’t exist.”69 The greatest illusion cybercriminals
have created is convincing the world that they only attack large
organizations. Symantec™, “a global leader in providing secur-
ity, storage and systems management solutions,”70 has reported
that, while data breaches have netted cybercriminals hundreds
of millions71 of identities,72 “the median number of identities
stolen . . . [was] 7,000 in 2014. Using the median [is] . . . helpful
. . . since it ignores the extreme values caused by the notable . . .
[large data breach] . . . events that resulted in the largest num-
bers of identities’ being exposed.”73 In short, in 2014, “[sixty]
percent of all targeted attacks struck [were] small- and medium-
sized organizations. These organizations often have fewer re-
sources to invest in security, and many are still not adopting ba-
sic best practices . . . . This puts not only the businesses, but also
their business partners [and clients], at higher risk.”74 Thus,
“[c]yber theft, cyber extortion, mobile device loss, misappropri-
ation of confidential business information, and unauthorized
sects with the role of [the private sector], state and local
governments.
Guidebook on Best Practices for Airport Cybersecurity, supra note 54, at Airport Cooper-
ative Research Program (copyright page).
68 If customers are going to bring their own electronic devices (BYOD) into
the “aviation ecosystem,” then they should be responsible for maintaining a rea-
sonable level of cybersecurity on these devices.
69 THE USUAL SUSPECTS (Gramercy Pictures 1995).
70 See Corporate Fact Sheet, SYMANTEC (2013), http://www.symantec.com/con-
tent/en/ca/about/media/Symantec_Corporate_Fact_Sheet.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7DGH-ZEWZ].
71 According to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 121,544,707 records had
been breached in 2015 as of Aug. 25, 2015. Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach/new (last visited Oct.
12, 2017) [https://perma.cc/YH6G-XNZ9].
72 Top 3 Sectors Breached in 2014 and Number of Identities Exposed: (1) Re-
tail Sector, 205,446,276; (2) Financial Sector, 79,465,597; and (3) Computer
Software Sector, 35,068,405. See Watering Hole Attacks, supra note 58, at 82.
73 Symantec, Internet Security Threat Report, 19 ISTR 1, 13 (2014),
www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b-istr_main_re
port_v19_21291018.en-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5G5-6S8M].
74 Watering Hole Attacks, supra note 58, at 6.
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disclosures of protected information are real and present dan-
gers for organizations of all sizes and across all industries.”75
C. MAINTAINING CLIENT CONFIDENCES
“Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and
client and the proper functioning of the legal system require the
preservation by the lawyer of confidential information of one
who has employed or sought to employ the lawyer,”76 regardless
of whether the information is tangible or digital:
Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct admonishes
that “a lawyer shall provide competent representation to a cli-
ent.” The rule defines “competent representation” as requiring
“the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation rea-
sonably necessary for the representation.” . . . And commentary
to the rules states that “[t]o maintain the requisite knowledge
and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and
its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with rele-
vant technology.”77
This ethical duty also extends to the attorney’s use of assistants
and third parties.78 Applying these principals to cybersecurity,
there is an ethical duty for attorneys to provide a reasonable
75 Peter Sloan, The Reasonable Information Security Program, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH.
2, 2 (2014), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v21i1/article2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5DXG-CERH].
76 Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 1.05 cmt. 1.
77 Rose L. Romero et al., Data Privacy Issues, ESSENTIALS OF BUS. L. COURSE 1, 5
(2015) (citations omitted).
78 For example, Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 5.03 (Responsibili-
ties Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants) states, in part: “With respect to a non-lawyer
employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer . . . a lawyer having direct
supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure
that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the
lawyer . . .” Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 1.05. Comment 1 provides
further clarification on the attorney’s ethical duties:
Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice . . . . Such as-
sistants act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer’s professional
services. A lawyer should give such assistants appropriate instruc-
tion and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their em-
ployment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose
information relating to representation of the client, and should be
responsible for their work product.
Id. at cmt. 1. In Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 572 , the issue was whether a
lawyer may, without the client’s express consent, send client’s privileged informa-
tion to an independent contractor hired by the lawyer to perform services in
connection with the client’s representation. Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op.
572 (2006). The Ethics Committee concluded that a lawyer may disclose privi-
leged information to an independent contractor “if the lawyer reasonably expects
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infrastructure for the protection of their client’s confidential in-
formation and to use due diligence in the protection of this in-
formation when access to it is given to independent
contractors.79
D. COMPLYING WITH THE LAW
Given its reliance upon e-commerce, the aviation industry col-
lects and uses personal information.80 “Forty-seven states, the
District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands
have enacted legislation requiring private or government enti-
ties to notify individuals of security breaches of . . . [statutorily
protected personal] information,”81 with each jurisdiction82 hav-
ing its own provisions for determining the type of information
to be protected, how and when notice is to be given, and
whether encryption is required.83
that the confidential character of the information will be respected by the inde-
pendent contractor.” Id.
79 A similar conclusion, but after a different legal analysis, was reached by JILL
D. RHODES & VINCENT I POLLEY, THE ABA CYBERSECURITY HANDBOOK: A RESOURCE
FOR ATTORNEYS, LAW FIRMS AND BUSINESS PROFESSIONALS 6 (2013).
80 See Matthew Lew et al., supra note 4, at 3.
81 Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 22,
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-tech-
nology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/S2DB-7SGJ].
82 The reader of this article is strongly encouraged to research and carefully
review personal information privacy laws applicable to their area of practice. For
general discussion of federal and state personal information privacy laws, see
Sloan, supra note 75, at 7–25.
83 For example, Texas is one of the forty-seven states with breach notification
laws. Specifically,
A person who conducts business in this state and owns or licenses
computerized data that includes sensitive personal information
shall disclose any breach of system security, after discovering or re-
ceiving notification of the breach, to any individual whose sensitive
personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been,
acquired by an unauthorized person.
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.053(b) (West 2009). The State of Texas then
broadly defines “sensitive personal information” as:
(2) “Sensitive personal information” means . . . :
(A) an individual’s first name or first initial and last name in
combination with any one or more of the following items,
if the name and the items are not encrypted:
(i) social security number;
(ii) driver’s license number or government-issued identi-
fication number; or
(iii) account number or credit or debit card number in
combination with any required security code, access
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E. MINIMALIZING THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF A DATA BREACH:
“AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION IS WORTH A POUND OF CURE”84
In the 2015 Cost of Data Breach Study: United States,85 a bench-
mark research sponsored by IBM and independently conducted
by the Ponemon Institute, it was found that forty-nine percent of
data breaches involved a malicious or criminal attack, nineteen
percent were the result of negligent employees,86 and thirty-two
code, or password that would permit access to an in-
dividual’s financial account; or
(B) information that identifies an individual and relates to:
(i) the physical or mental health or condition of the
individual;
(ii) the provision of health care to the individual; or
(iii) payment for the provision of health care to the
individual.
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.002 (West 2009) (emphasis added). Lastly,
the State of Texas imposes a legal duty on Texas businesses to protect “sensitive
personal information”:
Sec. 521.052. Business Duty to Protect Sensitive Personal
Information
A business shall implement and maintain reasonable procedures,
including taking any appropriate corrective action, to protect from
unlawful use or disclosure any sensitive personal information col-
lected or maintained by the business in the regular course of
business.
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § Sec. 521.052 (West 2009).
84 Benjamin Franklin, GOODREADS, https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/
247269-an-ounce-of-prevention-is-worth-a-pound-of-cure [https://perma.cc/
TPF7-LC47].
85 2015 Cost of Data Breach Study: United States, POMENON INST. 1, 8 (2015) [here-
inafter Ponemon U.S. Data Breach], https://nhlearningsolutions.com/Portals/0/
Documents/2015-Cost-of-Data-Breach-Study.PDF [https://perma.cc/JQ7H-
RAXB].
86 The 2015 Data Breach Investigations Report, a study conducted by Verizon™
with contributions from seventy corporate and governmental organizations from
around the world, found three main categories of internal error (data breach)
incidents:
• 30% of incidents: “D’oh!”—Sensitive information reaching incor-
rect recipients;
• 17% of incidents: “My bad!”—Publishing nonpublic data to pub-
lic web servers;
• 12% of incidents: “Oops!”—Insecure disposal of personal and
medical data.
Verizon Enterprise Solutions, 2015 Data Breach Investigations Report, VERIZON 1, 49
(2015), http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-
investigation-report_2015_en_xg.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CBL-BFB6]. In the
2015 Insider Threat Industry Report (a collaborative effort of Bitglass™, Dell
Software™, Fasoo™, LightCyber™, HEAT Software™, ObserveIT™, Palerra™,
RES Software™, Sergeant Laboratories™, SpectorSoft™, Vectra Networks™, and
Watchful Software™ in association with the Information Security Community on
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percent involved system glitches that included both IT and busi-
ness process failures. Furthermore, it was determined that every
year for the last ten years, the indirect costs of a data breach
(i.e., what a business spends on existing internal resources to
deal with the data breach) have exceeded the direct cost of a
data breach (i.e., what a business spends to minimize the conse-
quences of a data breach).87 Implementation of a reasonable
data security infrastructure88 can reduce the cost per lost record
caused by a data breach by more than thirty percent.89 The 2015
Cost of Data Breach Study: Impact of Business Continuity Manage-
ment90 found that the implementation of a business plan that
identified the cyber risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could
impact the business and then established a framework for build-
ing organizational resilience and effective response to the “cyber
event” had the following effects:
• 27% reduction in the mean time to identify a data breach;
• 41% reduction in the mean time to contain a data breach;
• 28% decrease in the likelihood of a data breach over the
next two years.91
LinkedIn™), it was found that “[p]rivileged users, such as managers [, officers,
and owners] with access to sensitive information, pose the biggest insider
threat . . . . This [was] followed by [current and former] contractors . . . consul-
tants . . . , and . . . employees . . . .” Crowd Research Partners, Insider Threat:
Spotlight Report, INFO. SEC. REP. 3, 8 (2015), http://crowdresearchpartners.com/
portfolio/insider-threat-report/ [https://perma.cc/VLB7-WX9M]. Additionally,
this report noted that there was a “rise in insider attacks . . . mostly due to a
combination of three factors: insufficient data protection strategies and solutions
. . . , the proliferation of sensitive data moving outside the firewall on mobile
devices . . . , and lack of employee training and awareness . . . .” Id. at 12. Accord-
ingly, a “reasonable information security program” must address and, to the ex-
tent possible, provide an effective plan to minimize these internal risks. Id. at 3.
87 Ponemon U.S. Data Breach, supra note 85, at 14.
88 This “security infrastructure” would include, but not be limited to, an “inci-
dent response plan and team in place, extensive use of encryption, . . . employee
training,” and business continuity management and IT leadership. Id. at 9.
89 Id.
90 2015 Cost of Data Breach Study: Impact of Business Continuity Management,
PONEMON INST. 1, 1 (2015) [hereinafter Ponemon Impact Study], http://public.
dhe.ibm.com/common/ssi/ecm/se/en/sew03074usen/SEW03074USEN.PDF
[https://perma.cc/YG28-N5GS]. This was another benchmark research spon-
sored by IBM and independently conducted by the Ponemon Institute. Id.
91 Id. at 1.
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IV. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS: IMPLEMENTATION
AND USE OF A RESILIENT CYBERSECURITY INFRA-
STRUCTURE FRAMEWORK AND COLLABORATIVE
SHARING OF CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION
A. A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
CYBERSECURITY
Cybersecurity threats place the “nation’s security, economy,
and public safety and health at risk.”92 To address these risks,
President Obama issued Executive Order 13636, Improving Criti-
cal Infrastructure Cybersecurity, on February 12, 2013.93 This Execu-
tive Order required the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) to develop a voluntary cybersecurity frame-
work: “a set of industry standards and best practices to help or-
ganizations manage cybersecurity risks.”94 On February 12, 2014,
the NIST issued the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity.95 The core of this framework consists of five concur-
rent and continuous functions which represent the lifecycle of
an organization’s management of cybersecurity risk: identify,
protect, detect, respond, and recover.96 In the context of the
NIST cybersecurity framework, these core elements have the fol-
lowing meaning:
Identify: Develop the organizational understanding to manage
cybersecurity risk to systems, assets, data, and capabilities; . . .
Protect: Develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to en-
sure delivery of critical infrastructure services; . . .
Detect: Develop and implement the appropriate activities to iden-
tify the occurrence of a cybersecurity event; . . .
Respond: Develop and implement the appropriate activities to
take action regarding a detected cybersecurity event; . . . [and]
Recover: Develop and implement the appropriate activities to
maintain plans for resilience and to restore any capabilities or
services that were impaired due to a cybersecurity event.97
92 Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity, Version 1.0, at 1 (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce 2014), https://
www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-
framework-021214.pdf [https://perma.cc/696P-8ZHK].
93 Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013) (“Im-
proving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity”).
94 Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, supra note 92, at 1.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 4.
97 Id. at 8–9.
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Similarly, Peter Sloan98 proposes that an organization develop
and implement a “reasonable information security program” in
which the entity99:
• [I]dentif[ies] the types of information in its possession, cus-
tody, or control for which it will establish security safeguards
(“Protected Information”);
• [A]ssess[es] the anticipated threats, vulnerabilities, and risks
to the security of Protected Information;
• [E]stablish[es] and maintain[s] appropriate policies and ad-
ministrative, physical, and technical controls to address the
identified threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to the security of
Protected Information;
• [A]ddress[es] the security of Protected Information in its
third-party relationships;
• [R]espond[s] to detected breaches of the security of Pro-
tected Information; and
• [P]eriodically review[s] and update[s] its policies and con-
trols for the security of Protected Information.100
B. APPLICATION OF A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY TO THE AVIATION INDUSTRY
Introducing new technologies without robust cybersecurity mea-
sures in place presents a risk to the [aviation] industry, in light of
evolving cyber threats . . . . For this reason, all aviation industry
stakeholders must fully understand the risks to their networks
and control systems from cyber threats and take steps to close the
gaps and potential vulnerabilities . . . .101
With these words, the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics (AIAA)102 issued its Framework for Aviation Cyber-
98 Mr. Sloan is an employee with the Information Governance Group, LLC,
and a member of The Sedona Conference, Working Group I (Electronic Docu-
ment Retention and Production) and Working Group XI (Data Security and Pri-
vacy Liability). See Peter Sloan, INFO. GOVERNANCE GRP., LLC, https://
infogovgroup.com/who-we-are/peter-sloan-professional-bio/ [https://
perma.cc/BU9G-8LV5]; see also Peter B. Sloan, THE SEDONA CONF., https://
thesedonaconference.org/bio/sloan-peter [https://perma.cc/59BA-PUT6].
99 Sloan, supra note 75, at 4–5, 25–92.
100 Id. at 4–5.
101 The Connectivity Challenge: Protecting Critical Assets in a Networked World—A
Framework for Aviation Cybersecurity, AM. INST. OF AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS 1,
7 (2013), https://www.aiaa.org/uploadedFiles/Issues_and_Advocacy/AIAA-
Cyber-Framework-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7ER-GNQ2].
102 According to AIAA:
With more than 30,000 individual members from 88 countries, [it]
. . . is the world’s largest technical society dedicated to the global
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security six months after President Obama issued Executive Or-
der 13636,103 Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,104 but
six months before the NIST issued the Framework for Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.105 In summary, the AIAA’s
Framework for Aviation Cybersecurity requested the aviation indus-
try to adopt the following cybersecurity framework:
• Establish common cyber standards for aviation systems;
• Ensure a cybersecurity culture;
• Understand the threat;
• Understand the risk;
• Communicate the threats and assure situational awareness;
• Provide incident response;
• Strengthen the defensive system;
• Define design principles;
• Define operational principles;
• Conduct necessary research and development; and
• Ensure that government and industry work together.106
Notwithstanding the efforts of AIAA, the NIST’s Framework for
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity has been more re-
cently applied to the aviation industry in the United States.107
For example, the Transportation Research Board (TRB), one of
the major divisions of the National Research Council and a part
of the National Academy of Sciences, published in 2015 its
aerospace profession. Created in 1963 by the merger of the two
great aerospace societies of the day, the American Rocket Society
(founded in 1930 as the American Interplanetary Society), and the
Institute of the Aerospace Sciences (established in 1933 as the Insti-
tute of the Aeronautical Sciences).
About AIAA, AM. INST. OF AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS, http://www.aiaa.org/
AboutAIAA/ [https://perma.cc/9TJP-5A9E].
103 Prior to issuance of Exec. Order No. 13636, in 2012, the Boeing Company
published in its online industry magazine an “information security strategy” de-
signed “to protect an airline’s information and technology assets.” Robert
Rencher et al., Securing Airline Information on the Ground and in the Air, QTR_03
AERO 1, 25–28 (2012), http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/ar-
ticles/2012_q3/5/ [https://perma.cc/Z4A2-539V]. “Boeing’s holistic cyber se-
curity aviation framework is designed to address both airborne and ground-based
cyber threats. The aviation industry benefits from the availability of a cyber secur-
ity information resource that provides a protected venue for exchanging sensitive
security information.” Id. at 28. After the issuance of Exc. Order No. 13636, Boe-
ing issued a written response applauding the Order and providing NIST with
their vision of how the new cybersecurity framework should be designed. THE
BOEING COMPANY, supra note 50, at 4–113.
104 See Exec. Order No. 13636, supra note 93.
105 See Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, supra note 92.
106 The Connectivity Challenge, supra note 101, at 5–6, 9.
107 Guidebook on Best Practices for Airport Cybersecurity, supra note 54, at 10–14.
798 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
Guidebook on Best Practices for Airport Cybersecurity in which the
TRB used the NIST’s Framework to help it create cybersecurity
recommendations for airports.108 In a related use of an NIST
security framework (as shown by the figure below),109 the FAA
has incorporated the NIST’s Risk Management Framework110 for
federal information systems into its Acquisition Management
System (AMS)111:
Figure 12
C. A RESILIENT CYBERSECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE FRAMEWORK
“[W]e need to accept that we will never eliminate all risk,112
that nothing is permanently safe.”113 Therefore, a cybersecurity
108 Id.
109 GAO-15-370, supra note 34, at 26.
110 See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., Guide for Applying the Risk Manage-
ment Framework to Federal Information Systems: A Security Life Cycle Approach, at 5–9,
(U.S. Dep’t of Commerce 2010), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPubli
cations/NIST.SP.800-37r1.pdf [https://perma.cc/KME2-ULLF].
111 This is most likely for the purpose of resolving GAO’s finding that the Sur-
veillance and Broadcast Service Subsystem “Did Not Sufficiently Assess Key Con-
trols Prior to [program] Deployment.” GAO-15-370, supra note 34, at 35.
112 “The reality is that security breaches may be inevitable no matter how dili-
gently an organization safeguards its information.” Sloan, supra note 75, at 2.
113 2016 Threats Predictions, supra note 61, at 9.
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infrastructure framework must be designed to enable an organi-
zation to rapidly recover from the unexpected. In other words,
the framework must be resilient: “The term ‘resilience’ means
the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and
withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. Resilience in-
cludes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate at-
tacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents.”114
Consequently, as “part of Executive Order 13636 [Improving Crit-
ical Infrastructure Cybersecurity], the Department of Homeland Se-
curity (DHS) launched the Critical Infrastructure Cyber
Community or C3 (C Cubed) Voluntary Program.”115 The pur-
pose of this program is to assist the critical infrastructure sec-
tors116 and organizations in their use of the NIST Framework for
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.117 One element of
the “C Cubed” program is the option for an organization to par-
ticipate in a Cyber Resilience Review (CRR)118: “The CRR is a
no-cost, voluntary, non-technical assessment to evaluate an or-
ganization’s operational resilience and cybersecurity practices.
The CRR may be conducted as a self-assessment or as an on-site
assessment facilitated by DHS cybersecurity professionals.”119 By
utilizing the assessment generated by the CRR, an organization
114 Press Release, The White House, Presidential Policy Directive—Critical In-
frastructure Security and Resilience (Feb. 12, 2013) [hereinafter (PPD)-21],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-
directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil [https://perma.cc/F6J7-VKZL].
115 U.S. Comput. Emergency Readiness Team, Critical Infrastructure Cyber Com-
munity Volunteer Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.us-cert.gov/
ccubedvp (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) [https://perma.cc/JCW4-5BTT].
116 In (PPD)-21, the President identified sixteen critical infrastructure sectors:
Chemical; Commercial Facilities; Communications; Critical Manufacturing;
Dams; Defense Industrial Base; Emergency Services; Energy; Financial Services;
Food and Agriculture; Government Facilities; Healthcare and Public Health; In-
formation Technology; Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste; Transportation
Systems; and Water and Wastewater Systems. (PPD)-21, supra note 114. For more
details on each sector, see Critical Infrastructure Sectors, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors (last visited Oct. 13,
2017) [https://perma.cc/5E3C-TF4D].
117 Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community Volunteer Program, supra note 115.
118 U.S. Comput. Emergency Readiness Team, Assessments: Cyber Resilience Re-
view (CRR), U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.us-cert.gov/ccubedvp/
self-service-crr (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) [https://perma.cc/QFM4-6D4E].
119 Id. (emphasis added); see also Cyber Resilience Review (CRR): NIST Cybersecurity
Framework Crosswalks, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Feb. 2016), https://www.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/c3vp/csc-crr-nist-ramework-crosswalk.pdf [https://
perma.cc/R3GN-4N26].
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has the ability to evaluate the resiliency of its cybersecurity infra-
structure framework before a critical event occurs.
D. ENSURING THAT GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY WORK
TOGETHER120: COLLABORATIVE SHARING OF CYBERSECURITY
INFORMATION UNDER THE CYBERSECURITY ACT OF 2015
On December 18, 2015, H.R. 2029, the Cybersecurity Act of
2015, was signed into law as part of Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2016121: The Cybersecurity Act of 2015 “encourages pri-
vate companies to voluntarily share information122 about cyber
threats with each other as well as the government. Firms that
participate in the information sharing will receive liability pro-
tection.”123 By enabling the collaborative sharing of cyber-
120 See The Connectivity Challenge, supra note 101, at 6, 9.
121 See Consolidated Appropriations Act 2016, Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub.
L. No. 113-114, 129 Stat. 2242 (2015).
The Cybersecurity Act of 2015 represents a compromise between
the House and Senate intelligence committees and the House
Homeland Security Committee. It includes various components of
three separate information sharing bills: H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731,
passed by the House in [ ] 2015, and S. 754, passed by the Senate in
October [of] 2015.
RITA TEHAN, Cybersecurity: Legislation, Hearings, and Executive Branch Documents,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 1, 3 (last modified June 23, 2017), https://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R43317.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2XS-DYAH]. This analysis comes
from a report written by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). “[CRS]
works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analy-
sis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party
affiliation.” Congressional Research Centers, LIB. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/cr-
sinfo/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4HDV-2BXP].
122 Prior to this enactment, on February 13, 2015, the President issued Execu-
tive Order Number 13691 (titled Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information
Sharing) to enhance the sharing of cybersecurity information. Exec. Order No.
13691, 80 Fed. Reg. 9349 (Feb 20, 2015).
123 TEHAN, supra note 121. Specifically, with regard to the federal government’s
sharing of cyber threat information, this Act states:
Sec. 102. DEFINITIONS
(14) NON-FEDERAL ENTITY.—
(A) In General.—Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph,
the term “non-Federal entity” means any private entity, non-Federal
government agency or department, or State, tribal, or local govern-
ment (including a political subdivision, department, or component
thereof).
(B) Inclusions.—The term “non-Federal entity” includes a govern-
ment agency or department of the District of Columbia. . . .
(C) Exclusion.—The term “non-Federal entity” does not include a
foreign power . . .
Sec. 103. SHARING OF INFORMATION BY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT.
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security information between government and the private
sector, the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 enhances aviation’s (and
the country’s) ability to fight cyber-attacks:
The optimal approach to securing aviation defense is for the gov-
ernment and industry to collaborate, sharing threat data and sen-
sitive information. Providing a forum where industry
stakeholders can receive and share threat data would increase
the speed at which threats can be mitigated across the aviation
system. This gives all parties involved an opportunity to share ef-
fective countermeasures against specific attacks and
adversaries.124
(a) In General.—Consistent with the protection of classified in-
formation, intelligence sources and methods, and privacy
and civil liberties, the Director of National Intelligence, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense,
and the Attorney General, in consultation with the heads of
the appropriate Federal entities, shall jointly develop and is-
sue procedures to facilitate and promote—
(2) the timely sharing with relevant Federal entities and non-Fed-
eral entities of cyber threat indicators, defensive measures,
and information relating to cybersecurity threats or author-
ized uses under this title, in the possession of the Federal
Government that may be declassified and shared at an un-
classified level;
(3) the timely sharing with relevant Federal entities and non-Fed-
eral entities, or the public if appropriate, of unclassified, in-
cluding controlled unclassified, cyber threat indicators and
defensive measures in the possession of the Federal
Government;
(4) the timely sharing with Federal entities and non-Federal entities,
if appropriate, of information relating to cybersecurity
threats or authorized uses under this title, in the possession
of the Federal Government about cybersecurity threats to
such entities to prevent or mitigate adverse effects from such
cybersecurity threats.
Consolidated Appropriations Act 2016, supra note 121, at §§ 102(14), 103(2)–(4)
(emphasis added). With regard to private sector cyber-related information
shared with the federal government, Section 105 (d)(1) states that providing
such information “shall not constitute a waiver of any applicable privilege or pro-
tection provided by law, including trade secret protection.” Id. at § 105(d)(1).
Section 104(e)(1) of the Act also provides an antitrust exemption: “It shall not be
considered a violation of any provision of antitrust laws for 2 or more private
entities to exchange or provide cyber [information] . . . for cybersecurity pur-
poses under this [Act].” Id. at §104(e)(1).
124 The Connectivity Challenge, supra note 101, at 12.
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IV. CONCLUSION
If “eternal vigilance is the price of liberty,”125 then without
constant vigilance cybersecurity is just an illusion of the
moment.126
“The importance of the aviation industry to the nation’s econ-
omy cannot be understated. The growth rate of civil aviation has
outpaced the overall growth of the U.S. national economy.”127
As a result of this increased growth and the never-ending depen-
dence upon technology, “[cybersecurity] threats to civil aviation
operations have become more sophisticated and challenging to
deal with.”128 While cybersecurity improvements have been
made to the nation’s aviation systems,129 many more security en-
hancements are needed.130 In the final analysis, cybersecurity is
more than just “implementing a checklist of requirements—
cybersecurity is managing cyber risks131 to an ongoing and ac-
ceptable level,”132 with the ability to rapidly recover from the un-
expected.133 A resilient NIST cybersecurity framework provides a
scalable method of accomplishing this task. Notwithstanding,
given the ever-changing landscape of cyber threats,134 more is
required: cybersecurity collaboration135 and constant vigilance.
125 This quote is generally attributed to Thomas Jefferson. But see Eternal Vigi-
lance is the Price of Liberty, THIS DAY IN QUOTES (Jan. 28, 2015),
www.thisdayinquotes.com/2011/01/eternal-vigilance-is-price-of-liberty.html
[https://perma.cc/TYD8-F634].
126 See Hyattye O. Simmons, Cyber Security and Data Privacy, 23 TEX. MINORITY
COUNS. PROGRAM 1, 1 (2015).
127 See Matthew Lew et al., supra note 4, at 1.
128 Lim, supra at note 52, at 81.
129 See GAO-15-370, supra note 34, at 30.
130 See id. at 41; GAO-15-221, supra note 7, at 31–32; see generally REP. FI-2016-
001, supra note 7.
131 Ethical and statutory duties, together with best business practices, require
that the attorney be able to understand, analyze, evaluate, design, and create a
reasonable cyber-security framework for the protection of their clients.
132 C3 Voluntary Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 2015), https://
www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/c3vp/smb/CCubedVP_Outreach_and_Mes-
saging_Kit_SMB.pdf (citing Cyber Risk Management Primer for CEOs of Small & Mid-
size Businesses page) [https://perma.cc/EWV6-U6M8].
133 See (PPD)-21, supra note 114.
134 See 2016 Threats Protections, supra note 61; McAfee Threats Report, supra note
56.
135 Consolidated Appropriations Act 2016, Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L.
No. 113-114, 129 Stat. 2242 (2015).
